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A
t about midnight on 7 September 2004, a mother 
arrived at her 11-year-old daughter’s bedside in a 
provincial hospital in Thailand. She sat down, hugged 
and kissed her child, and wiped secretions from her mouth. 
Little did she know that her daughter’s breathing difﬁ  culties 
were caused by the deadly H5N1 avian inﬂ  uenza virus. The 
next day, the girl was dead and, nearly two weeks later, so too 
was the mother, making a strong case for the virus passing 
from one human to another [1].
Until the inﬂ  uenza A virus H5N1 ﬁ  nds a way to do this with 
greater efﬁ  ciency, it will not be causing a pandemic. Yes, it 
has managed the leap from birds to humans, and yes, it has 
killed about half of those unfortunate enough to catch it. But 
we need only be really worried if the virus somehow stumbles 
upon a genetic combination that allows it to jump easily from 
human to human. Only then will we face the pandemic that 
the world’s media would have us believe is imminent. 
So do we have any idea how avian H5N1 might acquire the 
deadly property of human-to-human transmission? Recent 
developments in the molecular genetics of inﬂ  uenza A 
could provide some answers. At the very least, they are laying 
important groundwork that should help tame the impact of a 
pandemic version of H5N1, should it appear.
Rapid Evolution
There are three kinds of inﬂ  uenza: A, B, and C. Inﬂ  uenza 
B and C aren’t much to worry about, at most causing minor 
illness. The inﬂ  uenza A viruses, by contrast, are highly 
variable and so have the potential to outwit the human 
immune system and cause a pandemic (Box 1). 
A year ago, there were only seven complete sequences 
of the common inﬂ  uenza A subtype H3N2 mapped out in 
public-domain databases. By the end of 2005, there were 
more than 500. This immense molecular leap is largely due 
to the Inﬂ  uenza Genome Sequencing Project, a partnership 
between the US National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases and collaborators around the world (Figure 1).
This has radically changed what we know about the 
evolution of inﬂ  uenza A viruses, says Steven Salzberg of The 
Institute for Genomic Research at the University of Maryland, 
Rockville, Maryland, United States, and one of the scientists 
involved in the sequencing project. This research gives an 
in-depth insight into the evolution of the H3N2 subtype in 
New York state between 1999 and 2004, ﬁ  ndings that almost 
certainly apply to other inﬂ  uenza viruses, including avian 
H5N1 [2].
RNA-based organisms such as inﬂ  uenza viruses present a 
special problem for the would-be sequencer: the RNA must 
ﬁ  rst be converted to DNA. This can be achieved by calling 
upon the talents of reverse transcriptase, an enzyme that 
retroviruses such as HIV use to churn out DNA from an RNA 
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Figure 1. Inﬂ  uenza A Virus
(Image: CDC/F. A. Murphy)
Box 1. The Background to Inﬂ  uenza A
Inﬂ  uenza A is made up of a protein coat or capsid that 
houses the viral genome, a single strand of RNA split into eight 
segments, each carrying a single gene. One of these encodes 
hemagglutinin (HA), a surface antigen that the virus uses to bind 
to and break into host cells. Another gene produces a second 
surface antigen, neuraminidase (NA), which helps newly formed 
virus escape to infect other cells. 
The host immune system targets HA and NA, subjecting them 
to strong selective pressure. Genetic mutation, subtly altering the 
antigenic properties of these two target proteins, is sometimes 
referred to as antigenic drift. Antigenic shift, by contrast, is a 
major change in the antigenic properties of these two proteins 
caused by reassortment of one or more of the 16 known HA 
subtypes (H1 to H16) or the nine NA subtypes (N1 to N9) that 
circulate in wild birds.
Humans have been exposed to only H1, H2, and H3 viruses in 
the recent past. Consequently, a virus with an unfamiliar subtype, 
such as H5N1, will go undetected by the immune system of 
everyone alive today.
The six other genes that make up the inﬂ  uenza genome have 
received less scrutiny, but there is increasing evidence that they 
play an important role in adaptation of virus to host.
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template. The challenge is to get the reverse transcriptase to 
bind to the viral RNA so it can set about its work.
“It’s a chicken and egg problem,” Salzberg says. The reverse 
transcriptase needs to be instructed where to bind to the 
RNA and how much of it to copy. But developing primers to 
do this requires knowledge of the RNA sequence, the very 
unknown you’re trying to ﬁ  nd. 
Salzberg and his colleagues on the Inﬂ  uenza Genome 
Sequencing Project managed to cobble together primers 
based on existing fragments of H3N2 that had already been 
sequenced. Armed with this valuable set of primers, they have 
sequenced several hundred H3N2 human inﬂ  uenza isolates 
from the New York area. 
The major ﬁ  nding, ﬁ  rst published in PLoS Biology and 
recently in Nature, is that there is surprising genetic variation 
within a single inﬂ  uenza subtype that would not be detected 
without this whole-genome approach [2,3]. Although all 
New York isolates they scrutinized were H3N2 viruses, 
phylogenetic analysis based on the entire genetic sequence 
reveals three distinct subpopulations, some more sensitive 
to vaccine than others. “In the 2003–2004 ﬂ  u season, a new 
dominant strain emerged from one of these subpopulations 
against which the vaccine was largely ineffective,” Salzberg 
says. This suggests that there is important genetic variation 
that is being missed by tagging these variants with the same 
“H3N2” label. “We may need a new way of categorizing 
these viruses that will reﬂ  ect these differences,” he says. 
The Inﬂ  uenza Genome Sequencing Project is now working 
on putting together a set of primers designed for H5N1, 
Salzberg says.
Generating Variation
There are thought to be two main mechanisms through 
which such genetic variation is generated. First, single 
amino acid changes are frequently introduced during virus 
replication. Second, if two different viruses infect the same 
individual, they can exchange one or more genetic segments, 
a process known as reassortment. 
Salzberg’s analysis demonstrates both of these processes in 
the New York samples. This helps to explain why inﬂ  uenza 
is such a slippery customer and why a vaccine that works one 
year will be ineffective the next: frequent mutation allows the 
virus to keep one step ahead of the human immune system, 
and reassortment means that sometimes it will take a sudden 
sideways leap, completely outwitting our defenses.
These tricks of the inﬂ  uenza A virus trade—frequent 
mutation and reassortment—appear to be generating even 
greater variation in the current bête noire, H5N1 (Figure 2). 
In 2004, phylogenetic analysis of a handful of H5N1 strains 
conﬁ  rmed that a series of reassortment events had given rise 
to several competing forms of the virus [4]. 
This may account for the appearance of H5N1 in an 
alarmingly diverse range of species. The 2004 family tree 
indicates that the H5N1 strain dominant in southeast Asia 
originated in domestic ducks. It has, however, now become 
endemic in poultry across Asia, found its way into countless 
species of wild bird, and even turned up in mammals such 
as pigs, cats, leopards, tigers, and, of course, humans. The 
concern is that one of the many genetic incarnations of this 
virus will hit upon what it takes to be transferred from person 
to person. 
Pandemic Mutations
The 20th century saw three inﬂ  uenza pandemics (Box 2). 
Jeffrey Taubenberger and his co-workers at the Armed 
Forces Institute of Pathology in Washington, D.C., United 
States, want to know if there are molecular lessons that 
can be learned from these ﬂ  u strains from history: how did 
these strains evolve in the ﬁ  rst place, is there anything about 
their genetic makeup that enabled them to cause a global 
outbreak of disease, and does H5N1 show any of the same 
killer features?
Molecular work in the 1970s and 1980s established that 
the 1957 and 1968 pandemic strains were the result of 
reassortment events. In 1957, the human inﬂ  uenza then 
“doing the rounds” acquired three genetic segments from 
an avian source, probably Eurasian wildfowl. This radical 
microbial innovation left the world’s human population 
vulnerable. In 1968, another reassortment mixed things up 
yet again.
The origin of the 1918 pandemic strain, by contrast, has 
been harder to crack. Nearly a decade ago, Taubenberger 
and his colleagues made a real breakthrough; they found 
isolates of the 1918 pandemic virus in the formalin-ﬁ  xed, 
parafﬁ  n-embedded lungs of an American serviceman [5] 
(Figure 4). They subsequently retrieved further samples of 
this deadly virus from a second soldier and also from a ﬂ  u 
victim exhumed from a frosty mass grave in Alaska. Since 
then, they carefully sequenced one gene after another until 
they completed the task last year [6].
The complete sequence of the 1918 pandemic strain 
reveals a key ﬁ  nding. Each segment is more similar to avian 
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0040050.g002
Figure 2. Transmission Electron Micrograph of Avian Inﬂ  uenza A 
H5N1 Viruses (Gold)
(Image: C. Goldsmith, Public Health Image Library [CDC])
“In the 2003–2004 ﬂ  u season, 
a new dominant strain emerged ... 
against which the vaccine was 
largely ineffective.”
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viruses than to segments from any human strains. This 
suggests that it did not emerge through reassortment like the 
1957 and 1968 subtypes, but evolved directly via mutation 
from an avian virus. Taubenberger is hoping to ﬁ  nd a bit of 
preserved tissue that contains a precursor to the 1918 virus. 
“I would expect to ﬁ  nd a virus very similar to 1918 absent a 
few critical mutations that might be associated with human 
adaptation,” he predicts.
Although this research on the 1918 virus suggests that a 
pandemic version of H5N1 could emerge directly from an 
avian H5N1, Taubenberger is more concerned about genetic 
exchange between an avian and a human virus. “I would still 
bet on reassortment as the easiest mechanism to gain human-
to-human transmissibility,” he says.
In spite of the revelation that a pandemic strain can 
emerge through at least two different mechanisms, there may 
still be telling similarities between the three 20th-century 
pandemics. There are ten key mutations in the polymerase 
genes common to 1918, 1957, and 1968 that could allow 
adaptation to mammals, Taubenberger says. At the moment, 
it’s not entirely clear what these mutations are actually doing, 
but some of them could be important.
The set of H5N1 primers being developed by the Inﬂ  uenza 
Genome Sequencing Project should allow rapid sequencing 
of emerging strains of avian H5N1s to see if any of these key 
changes have occurred. This could give advance warning 
of the strains that pose the greatest threat, says Robert 
Belshe, professor of medicine, pediatrics, and molecular 
microbiology at Saint Louis University School of Medicine, 
St. Louis, Missouri, United States [7]. “We can get a handle 
on when some of these genetic changes will be acquired, 
and that may guide us to which virus may emerge as the next 
pandemic virus,” he says.
Of course, the next pandemic need not arise as a result 
of these same mutations, Taubenberger says. “A virus might 
adapt in multiple ways, unique for each event.” Nevertheless, 
there might be certain crucial mutations that will always be 
required, he suggests. At least three of the ten polymerase 
mutations have already occurred in H5N1s that infected 
humans, although not together in the same isolate. This 
suggests that H5N1 must undergo further genetic innovation 
before it can go pandemic. “There are still a number of 
changes that would have to happen in order for the virus to 
replicate efﬁ  ciently and spread in people,” Belshe says.
Prevention
Meanwhile, H5N1 continues to advance around the globe. 
Whilst it remains a problem ﬁ  rmly rooted in Asia, its 
appearance in Turkey, Romania, and Croatia last year raises 
the possibility that birds migrating to Africa this winter will 
Box 2. Outbreaks in History
In the past century, there were three inﬂ  uenza pandemics. The “Spanish inﬂ  uenza” of 1918 caused by the H1N1 subtype is estimated 
to have hit nearly a third of the world’s population (Figure 3A). Conditions at the end of World War I may have contributed to the
mortality; in just one year, it killed more than 40 million people (Figure 3B). The “Asian inﬂ  uenza” of 1957 resulted from a reassortment 
event, generating a new subtype: H2N2. There was little or no pre-existing immunity to this reassorted virus, and it is believed to have 
caused more than 2 million deaths. Eleven years later, further reassortment gave the prevailing human inﬂ  uenza a new surface protein, 
resulting in H3N2. This subtype killed about a million people and is currently the dominant subtype of human inﬂ  uenza. 
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0040050.g003
Figure 3. The Spanish Inﬂ  uenza
(A) Chart showing mortality from the 1918 inﬂ  uenza pandemic in the US and Europe.
(B) Emergency military hospital during inﬂ  uenza epidemic, Camp Funston, Kansas, United States. 
(Image: courtesy of the National Museum of Health and Medicine, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, Washington, D.C., United States.)
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“I would still bet on reassortment 
as the easiest mechanism to gain 
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have taken it with them. The close proximity between people 
and animals in eastern African countries creates another ideal 
breeding ground for the virus, says Joseph Dromenech, chief 
veterinary ofﬁ  cer for the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations. “Surveillance and capability to respond 
immediately after the detection of an outbreak is insufﬁ  cient,” 
he says. Surveillance is important because culling infected birds 
dramatically reduces the chance that humans will come into 
contact with the virus and, therefore, the opportunity for avian 
H5N1 to reassort with human inﬂ  uenza. 
Governments have also begun stockpiling antiviral drugs, 
which can block replication of most inﬂ  uenza A viruses or 
prevent their release from infected cells. Individuals have 
even gone in search of antivirals. In October of last year, 
the Internet auction giant eBay removed all listings for one 
antiviral from its British site as bids spiralled to more than 
£100 for a single dose. 
A more realistic means of coping with a pandemic is by 
vaccination. In the US, clinical trials are already under way 
to test vaccines against a strain of H5N1 made safe through a 
technique called “reverse genetics” (Figure 5). This involves 
stitching together DNA plasmids, each containing a single 
inﬂ  uenza gene. “You can design your own virus; therefore 
you can design your own vaccine,” says George Brownlee, 
professor of chemical pathology at Oxford University, United 
Kingdom, whose group pioneered this technique in the late 
1990s [8]. 
Such trials should help conﬁ  rm the safety of vaccination 
and determine the dosage and the number of doses needed 
to achieve effective immunity, Belshe says. Hopefully, 
antibodies raised from this vaccine will recognise the surface 
antigens on a pandemic inﬂ  uenza, giving some protection 
as researchers rush to decode the sequence of a pandemic 
strain and manufacturers work overtime to produce a vaccine 
against it. “Until we know what exact strain is going to occur 
and cause a pandemic, we really can’t make and stockpile 
vaccine,” Belshe says. 
So reverse genetics is also being used to try to second-guess 
the virus’ next move and explore which reassorted viruses 
have what it takes to cause a pandemic. These experiments 
are based on the assumption that if avian H5N1 reassorts 
with a human inﬂ  uenza, it will most likely do so with human 
H3N2. Virologists at the US Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, Georgia, are mixing genes from 
these two strains to ﬁ  nd out which combinations are capable of 
infecting mammalian cells and hence pose a threat to humans.
This approach is useful for determining the virulence and 
pathogenicity of different hypothetical reassortant strains, 
says Albert Osterhaus, professor of virology at Erasmus 
Medical Center, Rotterdam, The Netherlands. He is carrying 
out similar experiments working with another threatening 
avian subtype—H7N7—rather than H5N1. However, he 
points out, there is no way of ﬁ  nding out how efﬁ  ciently these 
lab-conﬁ  ned strains will pass from human to human. We will 
learn this only once a pandemic is under way.
The Near Future
Molecular cunning is clearly an important tool in preparing 
ourselves for an impending pandemic. The more we learn 
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0040050.g005
Figure 5. The Mechanics of Reverse Genetics 
(Image: courtesy of US National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases.)
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Figure 4. Lung from Inﬂ  uenza Victim Similar to That Used to Extract 
RNA from the 1918 Killer Strain 
(Image: courtesy of the National Museum of Health and Medicine, Armed 
Forces Institute of Pathology, Washington, D.C., United States. )PLoS Biology  |  www.plosbiology.org 0160 February 2006  |  Volume 4  |  Issue 2  |  e50
about the trickery used by inﬂ  uenza strains from history, 
the better placed we will be to determine what molecular 
changes are needed for a virus to pass from human to human. 
Armed with this knowledge, we may be able to anticipate 
the evolution of strains of avian inﬂ  uenza in the near future, 
helping to combat the next ﬂ  u pandemic when (not if) it 
occurs.  
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